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Abstract
Cyber-insecurity is a serious threat in the digital world. In the present paper, we argue that a subopti-
mal cybersecurity environment is partly due to organizations’ underinvestment on security and a
lack of suitable policies. The motivation for this paper stems from a related policy question: how to
design policies for governments and other organizations that can ensure a sufficient level of cyber-
security. We address the question by exploring a policy devised to alleviate information asymmetry
and to achieve transparency in cybersecurity information sharing practice. We propose a cyberse-
curity evaluation agency along with regulations on information disclosure. To empirically evaluate
the effectiveness of such an institution, we conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment on
7919 US organizations. Specifically, we generate organizations’ security reports based on their out-
bound spam relative to the industry peers, then share the reports with the subjects in either private
or public ways. Using models for heterogeneous treatment effects and machine learning tech-
niques, we find evidence from this experiment that the security information sharing combined with
publicity treatment has significant effects on spam reduction for original large spammers.
Moreover, significant peer effects are observed among industry peers after the experiment.
Key words: cybersecurity; policy design; randomized field experiments; information asymmetry; peer effects; regression tree;
random forest; heterogeneous treatment effects
Introduction
Cybersecurity has become a vital issue: our daily lives, businesses,
governments and society at large heavily rely on the Internet. In re-
cent years, the threat from cyber-attacks has been increasingly wit-
nessed around the world. Data from 2013 show that the average
cost of security breaches can be as much as 3.5 million—an increase
of 15% compared with that in the previous year (Data source: 2014
Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis by Ponemon Institute
LLC). According to PWC’s global state of information security re-
port, the number of detected incidents increased by 25% in 2013
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity/eo-
13636). In addition, a popular book, “Spam Nation”, reported that
anti-virus companies are fighting an average of 82,000 new attacks
every day [1]. McAfee—which is now Intel Security Group—
detected 14 million new pieces of malware in the first quarter of
2013 alone. One conspicuous example that has brought wide public
attention is Target Corporation’s data breach, which affected 2.6
million consumers during the holiday season in 2013 (The data
come from the announcement of Target. The incident caused a sig-
nificant amount of business and reputation loss to the company.
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Target has taken a series of security measures after the data breach,
including promoting its system, issuing more secure chip-and-PIN
cards, and deploying more advanced technology). The ever-rising
trend of cybersecurity incidents—such as data breaches in retail, fi-
nancial services, and health service companies—which is parallel to
the emergence of ever-sophisticated cyber-attacks, calls for more ef-
ficient solutions to the problem.
A large body of literature has investigated the root causes and
countermeasures to mitigate the cybersecurity issues from technical
and economic perspectives. In the economics literature, there is a
general consensus that cyber-insecurity is partly due to organiza-
tions’ underinvestment on security as a result of distorted incentives
by asymmetric information, network externalities, and moral hazard
[2, 3]. Organizations strategically choose a security protection level
that minimizes their private costs, whereas a social planner is moti-
vated to minimize the social cost. Without adequate policy interven-
tions, a socially suboptimal cybersecurity level is thus achieved. One
potential solution to this cybersecurity issue is to introduce policies
that bolster the overall security of the defender side, namely,
organizational-level security protection, and this is the present
paper’s point of departure. Evidently, given the same level of at-
tacks, a defending organization with stronger protection is less likely
to be compromised by the attackers. Although Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) are suitable for protection from various malicious
cyber-activities [4, 5], many organizations in various sectors, both
private and public, do not rely on ISPs and manage their own on-
premises infrastructures. Thus, it is particularly important for these
organizations to be prepared themselves against cyber-attacks.
The motivation for this paper stems from the following policy
question: How can we design policies for governments and other or-
ganizations that can ensure a sufficient level of cybersecurity? We
argue that current policies or regulations are not sufficient to effect-
ively encourage or force organizations to protect their systems and
information. Taking the US federal government as an example, there
are three main cybersecurity regulations: the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act in 1996, the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act in 1999, and the Homeland Security Act in 2002. These
regulations require health care organizations, financial institutions,
and federal agencies to take security measures to protect their sys-
tems and data. However, there are no regulations on other sectors,
especially for high-technology industries, in which companies man-
age large amount of valuable data. More recently, President Obama
signed Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity,” which emphasizes the importance of information
sharing and cybersecurity framework development (http://www.
whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity/eo-13636).
However, programs initiated according to the Executive Order are
mostly voluntary (For instance, according to the Executive Order,
the US Department of Homeland Security will promote the adoption
of cybersecurity framework through a voluntary program with the
help of security experts from the private sector), and thus the success
of the programs highly depends on how to incentivize organizations
to participate in them. More importantly, most government regula-
tions that have been recently introduced tend to be knee-jerk reac-
tions to cyber-threats, under which compromised companies are
arbitrarily fined. Such a lump sum fine is not effective, because it
would have no binding power to bigger companies and would com-
pletely wipe out the profits of smaller companies (A recent article
from the Financial Times delivers a similar point: http://www.ft.
com/intl/cms/s/0/817f4146-7e4e-11e5-a1fe-567b37f80b64.html).
One method to provide sufficient motivation for organizations is
to introduce information disclosure in order to alleviate the
cybersecurity information asymmetry [2]. Previous works such as
Moore and Claytone [6] and Tang et al. [7] found evidence that se-
curity information publication helps improve cybersecurity condi-
tions on the country level [6, 7]. In the present paper, we design a
fine-grained policy to incentivize security level improvement at the
organizational level. Specifically, we propose a nationwide cyberse-
curity evaluation agency: (i) that monitors and evaluates the security
performance of all organizations on the Internet using various data
including spam, phishing, and distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks and (ii) that publishes organizations’ cybersecurity evalu-
ation reports to the public. In this way, the evaluation institution
would work the same way as Moody’s or S&P do for bonds.
The rationale behind this institution is as follows. First, the infor-
mation disclosure helps reduce the information asymmetry issue
within an organization. Due to insufficient internal resources and
policies, some organizations with budget constraints may not have a
full understanding of their security problems [8]. The proposed insti-
tution can alleviate this problem with evaluation reports. Second,
the theory of asymmetric information predicts that organizations
will underinvest on cybersecurity when their customers cannot dis-
tinguish companies with strong security from those with weak secur-
ity. Publication of a cybersecurity evaluation report can force
organizations to raise their security bars for fear of losing customers
from their competitors [7, 9]. Third, a peer-ranking system can
allow organizations to make direct comparisons with their industry
peers, so that peer pressures can induce overall security
improvements.
It is important to evaluate the effectiveness of a proposed public
policy, and we present a randomized field experiment (RFE) in the
present paper. RFEs are regarded as the gold standard to estimate
the causal treatment effects of proposed policy, since, with careful
experiment design, it can exclude other confounding factors [10, 11,
12]. Although a series of studies measure the impact of cybersecurity
information disclosure on remedies and countermeasures, they are
not based on rigorous randomization; thus, it may be hard to claim
causal effects of the information disclosure [6, 13–17]. In our experi-
ment, we use outbound spam data as a proxy to estimate the latent
security levels of 7919 US organizations (We note that spam is one
out of many ways of evaluating security and that other metrics can
be used as alternatives, provided they can be externally observable
by outside researchers without internal audits. More discussions
about the security indicator are in the “Data collection” section).
With careful randomization, we divide the subjects into three
groups. The first is the control group, to which we take no action.
The second is the private treatment group, to which we provide with
exclusive security reports via emails. The last is the public treatment
group, to which we provide emails with security reports including
explicit information that the report is publicly available on our ex-
periment website. The private treatment is to measure the informa-
tion awareness treatment effects, and the public treatment is to
estimate the publicity effects. Our empirical results show that the
combination of information and publicity successfully reduces the
outbound spam volume of large unwitting intermediaries (i.e. com-
promised organizations). However, the data show that security in-
formation disclosure by itself does not have a significant average
treatment effect. To evaluate the heterogeneous policy impacts, we
analyze treatment effects for different subgroups using causal tree
and causal forest [18, 19]. Furthermore, with the peer effect ana-
lysis, we find evidence that organizations’ security decisions are
influenced by the average outcome of their peers. This interesting
finding gives us confidence that our peer ranking system is effective
in spam reduction.
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The present paper has important contributions to the literature
and provides practical implications for policy makers. Our study
contributes to the literature by extending prior work on the effects
of security information disclosure and by providing potential poli-
cies to mitigate Internet insecurity problems. More importantly, our
experiment design and policy evaluation analysis could be a road
map for public policy evaluation in the cybersecurity area, which
can be generalized and extended to other potential security remedies
in different environments. Since our current experimental universe
includes only US organizations, the conclusions in this paper may
not be sufficiently applicable to organizations in other countries
with different economic and cultural environments. Researchers and
government staff in other countries can follow our large-scale field
experiment supported by the cloud computing to design effective
policies for their own countries. Finally, with the constructed secur-
ity metrics, we can potentially set up cybersecurity insurance pre-
miums for cyber risks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the
“Experiment design and implementation” section, we describe the
experimental design for our RFEs, followed by hypotheses develop-
ment in the “Hypotheses development” section. In the “Empirical
analysis” and the “Robustness check” section, we deliver the empir-
ical analysis of our paper. In the “Extending experiments” section,
we discuss the future research direction and conclude the paper.
Experiment design and implementation
As discussed in the “introduction” section, one potential solution to
the security problem is to alleviate the information asymmetry of
cybersecurity. Following previous works such as Moore and
Clayton [6] and Tang et al. [7], we propose a cybersecurity evalu-
ation agency that actively monitors organizational security levels
and shares the evaluation reports to the focal organization and the
public [6, 7], thus reducing the cybersecurity information asym-
metry problem. Ideally, the institution would monitor all organiza-
tions’ security performances using externally observable data such
as spam, phishing, and DDoS attacks and publish them on its public
website. Since the institution evaluates and publicizes the latent se-
curity condition for each organization, consumers and investors can
make informed decisions by incorporating the available security
information.
This proposed institution could be quite costly, considering the
large number of involved organizations. Thus, a preliminary evalu-
ation of the proposition’s effectiveness is prudent. We conducted a
large-scale RFE from January 2014 to March 2014 on 7919 US
organizations to see the treatment effects of information sharing and
publication on spam reduction, although the potential effectiveness
of our experiment would not be so remarkable compared with the
“real” proposed institution. To be more specific, we had three treat-
ment groups with two different information disclosure methods to
distinguish publicity effect from information notification effect. The
whole experiment can be summarized in Fig. 1.
Randomization
Rigorous randomization is needed to extract causality from our ex-
periment. We divide organizations into three equally sized groups—
the control group, the private treatment group, and the public treat-
ment group—using a stratified, match-pair randomization [20].
Specifically, we first define 195 subgroups by Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes (39 industry sectors) and number of IP
addresses (five segments). The detailed groups based on industry sec-
tors and numbers of IP addresses are listed in Tables A1 and A2 in
the Appendix. Then, we find clusters of three organizations within
each subgroup that minimize the sum of three pairwise differences
among them. After that, we randomly assign organizations in each
cluster into the control or treatment groups. Finally, we check the
distances between the control group and two treated groups with re-
spect to companies’ various characteristics (For more detailed infor-
mation, see the Appendix).
Data collection
As an organization’s cybersecurity level is a latent variable, we need
to find a good proxy that can be externally observable without any
internal audits. Our approach is to use outbound email spam gener-
ated from each organization’s autonomous system (AS). Spam is
defined as unsolicited bulk emails (https://www.spamhaus.org/con
sumer/definition/). As in Rao and Reiley [21] and Moore and
Clayton [6], most spam (over 90%) is sent from botnets, which are
the networks of virus-infected computers [6, 21]. These compro-
mised computers may also be used for even worse cyber-criminal
activities such as identity thefts, blackmails, and DDoS attacks.
Thus, we argue that organizations’ large outbound spam volumes
are an important indicator of their weak security levels.
Many security organizations maintain spam blocklists to black-
list IP addresses that actively engage in spam emission. These organ-
izations install various spamtraps, which are email-receiving
machines without valid users. Thus, any computers that attempt to
conduct email activities with the spamtraps are suspicious spam-
mers. Since these monitoring activities are done in the transmission
Figure 1. Design of randomized field experiment.
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control protocol level, spammer IP addresses are verified. In other
words, spam-sending IP addresses are not spoofed. In order to over-
come the potential biases on heterogeneous spamtrap settings [22],
we use two independent spam data feeds: Composite Block List
(CBL) (http://cbl.abuseat.org) and Passive Spam Block List (PSBL)
(http://psbl.org). Both blocklists provide us the list of spamming IP
addresses and their associated spam volumes on a daily basis.
From this raw IP-level data, we need to construct organization-
level data to evaluate each organization’s security condition. To do
that, we need three levels of mapping: from an IP to a netblock, to
an autonomous system number (ASN), then finally to an organiza-
tion. The data are based on the IPv4 address space, which uses class-
less inter-domain routing (CIDR) (http://tools.ietf.org/html/
rfc1519). Thus, the IP to netblock mapping, also known as IP
lookup, is a longest prefix matching problem, which has a well-
known efficient algorithm [23]. For netblock to ASN mappings, we
receive daily netblock-ASN data feeds from Team Cymru through
remote synchronization (rsync) (http://www.team-cymru.org). On
average, we have 584,000 netblocks and 49,000 ASNs in our map-
ping data. Finally, for ASN to organization mappings, we group
ASNs by the operating organization with manual inspections. Note
that we process only ASNs located in the USA for this experiment.
For each ASN group, we then find the corresponding organization
by searching the LexisNexis database (http://www.lexisnexis.com).
As a result, 7919 US organizations are identified for the experiment.
One may argue that spam is not a major cybersecurity threat for
organizations and that it can be largely solved using filtering and
blocklists. Also, there can be questions about whether outbound
spam volume is a comprehensive index of organizations’ security
level. However, we want to emphasize that, in our current experi-
ment, spam information is only a tool we apply to see how organiza-
tions’ security strategies will respond to our interventions. Given the
fact that spam is perceived as a less dangerous risk for those organ-
izations, we would expect that the treatment effects will be larger
and more significant if the security evaluation reports include other
cyber-attacks such as phishing and DDoS attacks.
In addition to the outbound spam data for each organization, we
collect organizations’ characteristics from the LexisNexis database,
including the industry codes (SIC and NAICS) and whether the or-
ganization is publicly traded.
Experiment treatments
Among the three groups in our experiment, the first one is the con-
trol group, to which we do not apply any treatments. For the two
treatment groups, we send treatment emails to relevant contacts in
various departments (from marketing to IT) within each organiza-
tion to inform them of their security evaluation reports. Treatment
emails were sent at the end of January and March 2014. Each treat-
ment email included (1) the organization’s spam volume, (2) peer
rankings, (3) a partial list of spamming IP addresses, and (4) a hyper-
link to a designated web page for the treated organization. The dif-
ference between the private and public treatment groups is whether
the information of the focal organization is publicly searchable on
our treatment website. For the publicly treated organizations, the
emails clearly mention that the spam information is publicized on
our treatment website (The link of our website: http://cloud.spam
rankings.net/). On the other hand, the privately treated organiza-
tions are notified that the web page directed by the link in the email
is not publicly available. With this setting, the difference of average
spam volumes between the control and the private treatment groups
is due to the information awareness effect. Similarly, we can
estimate the publicity treatment effect with the difference between
the private and public treatment groups.
Spam ranking for peer effects
In the security evaluation reports provided by the treatment emails
and website, we have our own peer ranking, which is different from
security rankings on other existing security evaluation websites.
Essentially, organizations within an industry sector are ranked ac-
cording to their spam metrics (Sectors are defined by the two digits
in two industry codes: SIC and North American Industry
Classification System [NAICS]. Note that high ranks indicate a low
security level and that all of the organizations with no spam will be
ranked equally with the lowest rank).
Currently, there are only a handful of websites that publish spam
information such as CBL, Spamhaus, and Cisco. These rankings pro-
vide information only for “top spammers.” And most of their infor-
mation is based on the unit of AS rather than organization
(Classic.SpamRankings.net presents the top 10 spammers per coun-
try [http://www.spamrankings.net/classic/]. Spamhaus posts top 10
spam-producing countries, ISPs, and spammers each day [http://
www.spamhaus.org/statistics/countries/]. Cisco, on the other hand,
has at most the top 100 spam senders by IP, network owners, and
country [http://www.senderbase.org/static/spam/]). Furthermore,
most companies are more likely to reactively disclose information
security issues in case of compromised customer information. This
may lead to underestimated information risk. Most importantly,
existing websites do not provide industry rankings. In other words,
an organization cannot directly compare its performance with its
close competitors. This lack of comparative information may
weaken peer effects.
Our peer ranking helps an organization to better evaluate its se-
curity performance against its competitors. The rationale of con-
structing peer ranking is as follows. First, there is substantial
heterogeneity across different industry sectors. For example, compa-
nies in financial and health sectors may have more sensitive cus-
tomer information that attracts more threats from cyber-attackers.
More importantly, it is well known that individuals’ and organiza-
tions’ behaviors are likely to be influenced by their peers [24]. Our
peer ranking can potentially provide a channel to enhance the peer
effects among organizations in the same industry sector, and can fur-
ther have an impact on organizational behavior. We demonstrate
the existence of peer effects in the following empirical analysis.
Hypotheses development
Information disclosure effect
The information disclosure effect refers to the treatment effect of
spam information provided in our treatment emails for organiza-
tions that previously neglected the importance or did not have a full
understanding of the security conditions due to insufficient internal
resources and policies [8]. In our present experiment, we send out
organization-specific spam report via email to each organization in
our treated groups. The detailed spam information includes spam
volumes, number of spamming hosts, specific infested IP addresses,
compositions of spam volumes over time, as well as its relative per-
formance (peer ranking) compared with close competitors within
the same industry. After receiving our emails, organizations without
good prior knowledge of their security levels can be better informed.
In addition, they also get information (e.g. infested IP addresses)
that helps them quickly isolate the problems. If our email treatment
with security information is helpful to treated organizations, we
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would expect the spam volume of organizations in the private treat-
ment group, who only receive private emails from the researcher,
will decrease, when compared with that in the control group.
Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1. There will be a significant decrease of spam vol-
umes after the experiment for organizations in the private treat-
ment group as compared with those in the control group due to
the spam information disclosure in the email treatment.
Publicity effect
The publicity effect refers to the treatment effect on the public treat-
ment group by publishing security evaluation reports on our public
treatment website. Due to security information asymmetry [2], it is
difficult for customers and investors to get relevant security informa-
tion for a focal organization. Thus, organizations may lack motiv-
ation to make sufficient investment in cybersecurity, especially when
the cost of cybersecurity improvement is relatively higher than the
expected cost of data breaches. Security information publication can
alleviate the information asymmetry problem since we provide the
public access to more detailed security information. In this way, cus-
tomers and investors can reevaluate their choices with more trans-
parent information; furthermore, our treatment website creates
extra cost to the organizations through the threat of reputation dam-
age and customer loss [7, 9]. If our publicity treatment is effective,
we would expect to see a greater decrease of spam volume for organ-
izations in the public treatment group, who receive both information
sharing and publicity treatments, than for those in the private treat-
ment group. We therefore propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. After the experiment, there will be a significantde-
crease of spam volumes for organizations in the public treatment
group as compared with those in the private treatment group,
due to the spam information publicity treatment.
In addition, organizations with large outbound spam volumes may
have security problems that are relatively easy to isolate and resolve.
From the reputational aspect, organizations with different ranks
may have heterogeneous levels of pressures from the publicity treat-
ment. Low-ranked organizations can be more embarrassed with the
publicity, whereas highly ranked organizations may view it as
praise, even though they still have positive outbound spam volumes.
These possible interpretations may lead to increased motivation for
large, unwitting intermediaries for spammers. Thus, our policy
interference may be more effective for organizations with larger pre-
experimental spam volumes.
Hypothesis 3. Organizations in the public treatment group with
higher spam volumes will have larger spam volume drops after
the experiment.
Peer effects
A peer effect refers to the change of an organization’s security level
that is influenced by its peer organizations’ performances.
Theoretically, a peer effect is driven by reputational concerns, obser-
vational learning, and other factors [25]. For example, organizations
in the same industry may have technical knowledge exchange among
their employers. Researchers have investigated peer effects in wide
variety of individual and corporate outcomes, including academic
achievement [26], product adoption [27], stock market behavior
[28], dividend payment [24], and managerial decision making [29].
In our case, organizations’ security strategies can also be influenced
by their peers.
In the security evaluation report, we try to induce peer effects by
providing industry rankings in addition to general spam metrics.
With the industry rankings, organizations and their customers can
make direct comparisons with competitors. Hence, an organization
may change its cybersecurity strategies in response to its peer organ-
izations’ security performance. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4. Organizations’ outbound spam volumes are-
influenced by their peers’ performance after the experiment.
Empirically identifying the existence of a peer effect is important in
understanding the mechanism by which our treatment influences or-
ganizations’ security strategies. Although we do not have an
advanced experiment design of randomization on peer ranking, if
publicity’s only effect is to embarrass the focal organizations, then
peer ranking may not be necessary for an effective policy. In add-
ition, the outcome of the treatment may be different. With the exist-
ence of peer effect, organizations’ security protection levels may
tend to converge to the center. In other words, organizations with
the best initial security levels may lower their guard after the publi-
city. Also, our treatment effects estimated from the experiment will
be those for the treated organizations. An ideal way to check the ef-
fect of our peer ranking would be an experiment with random treat-
ment of peer ranking. However, due to the interactions among
organizations, it is difficult to design such an experiment.
Empirical analysis
Descriptive statistics
Changes in the outbound spam are the basis of our experiment, but
the spam volumes fluctuate dramatically from month to month.
Although the most relevant reason for the outbound spam volume
changes is the change of organizational security levels, there could
be alternative reasons, such as the change of spam demand in the
black market and botnets’ strategic change of target victims to avoid
being detected. Thus, we use the average spam volumes over mul-
tiple months in the statistical analysis. Our data show that more
than half of the organizations with positive spam volumes have
experienced one or two spamming episodes a year. Therefore, we
use the 6-month average spam volumes right before the experiment
started as the pre-experimental spam volumes. Since our experiment
started at the end of January 2014, we regard the time frame be-
tween July 2013 and December 2013 to be the pre-experimental
period, and the one between February 2014 and July 2014 to be the
post-experimental period.
We use the natural logarithm transform for the outcome vari-
ables (monthly spam volumes and spam hosts) and the covariate
(number of IP addresses). This is because the distributions of these
outcome variables and the covariate are highly positively skewed, as
shown in Fig. 2. The power of the experiment has significantly im-
proved with the natural logarithm transform.
From the experimental data, we observe that the spam volume of
all organizations in our sample decreases on average after the experi-
ment. This may be due to the rapid increase of data breach an-
nouncements at the end of 2013. These incidents attracted much
attention from the public, so organizations generally became more
cautious about cybersecurity. In addition, the difference between
pre- and post-experimental spam volumes is quite heterogeneous
across organizations.
From Fig. 3, we see that organizations with zero (quantile 1) or
small initial spam volumes (quantile 2) have more outbound spam after
the experiment started, whereas top 25% spammers’ (quantile 4)
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outbound spam volumes have decreased. This result may be due to the
fact that small spammers, especially the organizations with zero spam
volumes, could hardly improve their security condition any more. On
the other hand, large spamming organizations in the treatment groups
will face the risk of losing customers and investors with our experiment,
leading to more cautious cyber security. We also observe that the spam
performance of organizations varies among different industry groups, as
shown in Fig. 4. This finding can be explained by the distinct business
models and characteristics of different industries.
The summary statistics of the related variables are listed in Table 1.
Balance on observables
The advantage of a RFE is that the random assignment ensures the
exogeneity of the treatments and the exclusion of selection bias [10].
In the randomization process, each organization has the same prob-
ability to be in one of the three groups; hence, on average, organiza-
tions in the control and treated groups have homogeneous
characteristics. However, it is well known that a pure random as-
signment may have a probability of imbalance along some dimen-
sions [30].
To ensure that our randomization successfully balances on
observables, we conduct two tests for validity. With the RFE setting
in the “Experiment design and implementation” section, we have
three groups Gi based on two treatments (T1i and T2i) as follows:
Gi
1 if T1i ¼ 0 and T2i ¼ 0
2 if T1i ¼ 1 and T2i ¼ 0





where T1i¼1 indicates that organization i receives treatment emails,
and T2i¼1 indicates that organization i’s security evaluation report
is publicized in the treatment website. We run regressions of pre-
experimental characteristics of organizations on the treatment as-
signments using the following formula:
Xi ¼ h0 þ h1T1i þ h2T2i þ /i; /i  Nð0;r2Þ; (2)
where Xi represents organization i’s characteristics (listed below) be-
fore the experiment, T1i is a dummy variable indicating whether or-
ganization i is privately treated or not, and T2i is the public
treatment dummy. We also apply a Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K–S) test
and calculate the difference in the normalized standard deviation to
check the balance based on the whole distribution of Xi. The results
are shown in Table 2. We see that the differences of the average
characteristics between the treatment and control groups are mar-
ginal, and none of them is statistically significant. Therefore, our
randomization groups are balanced.
Average treatment effect analysis
First of all, we would like to see the average treatment for all compa-
nies in our data set. We use the linear model to estimate the coeffi-
cients in our model as follows:
Yi ¼ a0 þ a1T1i þ a2T2i þ a3Xi þ 1i; 1i  Nð0;r21Þ; (3)
where Yi is the spam volume for organization i post-experiment, Xi
is the k-dimensional vector that represents organization i’s charac-
teristics, such as pre-experimental spam volume, pre-experimental
number of spamming IP addresses, number of IP addresses, number
Figure 3. Spam performance within each quantile for all organizations.
Figure 2. Distributions of spam volumes and numbers of IP addresses.
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of IP addresses squared, whether the organization is publicly traded
or not, number of observed botnets, and industry dummies.
The results are reported in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 present the
results from the regression model. As expected, all treatment effects
are negative, and the magnitude of public treatment effect is larger
than that of private treatment effect. However, the estimated treat-
ment effects lack statistical significance.
Most coefficients of the control variables are significant with ex-
pected signs. Organizations with more pre-experimental spam vol-
umes and larger number of botnets generally have more post-
experimental spam volumes, which can be evidence that the spam
volumes are a consistent indicator for the organizational latent se-
curity level.
Another interesting finding is that the relationship between spam
volumes and numbers of IP addresses is concave: As the number of
IP addresses increases, the spam volume first increases, then it de-
creases. The estimated largest spammer will have about 60,0000 IP
addresses. This phenomenon can be explained by two opposing
forces. On the one hand, organizations with large numbers of IP
addresses have wider attack surfaces because (i) institutions with
large IP counts generally have more potential targets for bot herders
(Bot herders are hackers who install malwares on victims’ computers
to gain unauthorized controls. https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/
2007/june/botnet_061307/) and (ii) it costs more to maintain and
protect the system. On the other hand, larger organizations may
have stronger security protection since many of them are high-tech
companies that have more resources for security investment. We
also estimated the regression with industry dummies defined by two-
digit SIC codes.
Heterogeneous treatment effects
Due to the heterogeneity and diversity of organizations in our sam-
ple, our interference may result in different outcomes among organ-
izations. In addition to the overall policy impact estimation, it is
also important and significant for us to see which organizations
have been mostly influenced by the policy. As we observed in Fig. 3,
only large spammers tend to have reduced spam volumes after our
intervention. Spam volumes for smaller spammers—especially for
the initially “clean companies” actually increased. To see how the
treatment effects vary among different organizations, we use non-
parametric causal tree [18] and causal forest [19] to estimate the het-
erogeneous treatment effects. We first use our results from regres-
sion tree as a guidance to split the sample within which we calculate
the heterogeneous treatment effects presented in columns 3-6 of
Table 3. One common concern of exploring the heterogeneous treat-
ment effects is that researchers will arbitrarily divide samples into
subgroups, searching for extreme subsample results. The new meth-
ods we use are data-driven that do not need any subjective restric-
tion or judgment. We also use random forest to reduce variance of
the key treatment effect estimates. The models are revised regression
tree and revised random forest with a modified criterion for splitting
the data set. Rather than using the dependent variable as the
Figure 4. Spam performance in different industry groups.
Table 1. Summary statistics
Variable Observation Mean Standard deviation Min Max
log (Post-experimental spam volumeþ1) 7919 2.469 3.139 0 17.913
log (Post-experimental spam hostþ1) 7919 1.830 2.072 0 12.134
log (Pre-experimental spam volumeþ1) 7919 2.474 3.258 0 18.566
log (Pre-experimental spam hostþ1) 7919 1.738 2.064 0 12.261
log (Number of IP addresses) 7919 7.807 2.289 0 18.333
Number of infesting botnets 7919 1.175 2.677 0 40
Publicly traded or not 7919 0.0885 0.284 0 1
log (Number of employees) 7021 1.410 0.605 0 2.860
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Table 2. Baseline comparison for internal validity
No control Industry fixed effects K–S prob. Ln(St/Sc)
Dependent variables Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public
Pre-experimental spam volume 0.00016 0.005447 0.00476 0.005676 1.000 0.998 0.008146 0.01713
(0.03833) (0.03646) (0.03542) (0.03357)
Pre-experimental number of
infested IP addresses
0.00548 0.0009089 0.00996 0.000657 1.000 0.997 0.01454 0.01798
(0.02933) (0.01993) (0.02791) (0.01989)
Number of IP addresses 0.03488 0.02178 0.04225 0.01687 0.891 0.997 0.02775 0.03337
(0.04453) (0.04150) (0.04199) (0.03893)
Number of botnets 0.003922 0.005299 0.001906 0.003606 1.000 1.000 0.00112 0.02757
(0.04076) (0.03692) (0.03943) (0.03397)
Publicly traded or not (¼1 if yes) 0.00145 0.006752 0.00206 0.007416 1.000 1.000 0.01439 0.06947
(0.00707) (0.00705) (0.00702) (0.00716)
Notes: This table presents comparisons of organizations’ characteristics in the control and treatment groups. Columns 1 and 3 contain estimates of the average
differences in characteristics between the control and private treatment organizations, without controls and with industry group fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4
contain estimates of the average differences in characteristics between the control and public treatment organizations, without controls and with industry group
fixed effects. Columns 5 and 6 contain statistics from Kolmogorov–Smirnov test. Columns 7 and 8 contain the differences in normalized standard deviations be-
tween the treatment and control groups. Standard errors are clustered by industry group and shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Table 3. Treatment effect estimation
Avg. treatment effects Heterogeneous treatment effects
Overall Private versus control Public versus control
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private treatment 0.0154 0.00811 0.258 0.149
(0.0868) (0.0336) (0.2440) (0.1010)
Public treatment 0.0607 0.061 0.310* 0.259***
(0.0862) (0.0408) (0.1740) (0.0663)
Indicator 6.887*** 0.688*** 5.154*** 0.539**
(0.1780) (0.1670) (0.1270) (0.2180)
Private treatment  indicator 0.265 0.173
(0.2530) (0.1050)
Public treatment  indicator 0.309* 0.265***
(0.1820) (0.0755)
Pre-experimental spam volume 0.547*** 0.542*** 0.493***
(0.0230) (0.0174) (0.0169)
Number of IP addresses 0.393*** 0.333*** 0.386***
(0.0552) (0.0636) (0.0644)
(Number of IP addresses)2 0.0144*** 0.0112*** 0.0140***
(0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0040)
Number of botnets 0.282*** 0.231*** 0.289***
(0.0406) (0.0368) (0.0330)
Stock 0.0724 0.189*** 0.0285
(0.0671) (0.0579) (0.0945)
Intercept 2.494*** 1.639*** 8.696*** 0.639** 6.277*** 1.103***
(0.0615) (0.2010) (0.1720) (0.2930) (0.1220) (0.2430)
Industry No Two-digit SIC No Two-digit SIC No Two-digit SIC
P-value for H0: a1¼ a2 0.7363 0.322
Observations 7919 7919 5280 5280 5280 5280
R-squared 0 0.744 0.434 0.751 0.501 0.745
Notes: This table displays the estimated private and public treatment effects with OLS model. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates of the differences between
the spam volume of treatment groups and control controlling for pre-experimental spam volume, number of pre-experimental IP addresses, number of pre-experi-
mental IP addresses squared, number of pre-experimental infesting botnets, whether or not publicly traded, and industry fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 report the
estimates of the heterogeneous treatment effects with organizations in control and public treatment group. The indicator equals to 1 if organization’s log pre-ex-
perimental spam volume is less than 3.6. Columns 5 and 6 report the estimates of the heterogeneous treatment effects with organizations in control and private
treatment group. The indicator equals to 1 if organization’s log pre-experimental botnet is less than 3.4. Standard errors are clustered by industry codes and
shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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criterion, the causal tree and causal forest use the average treatment
effect within each leaf. The confidence interval for the causal forest
estimator could be calculated following an infinitesimal jackknife
procedure [31]. These models allow us to estimate the conditional
average treatment effect (CATE) for subset sample (We would like
to thank Susan Athey for the R codes of causal forest and causal
tree).
Causal tree
In traditional machine learning techniques, a regression tree is a pre-
dictive model that maps observations to an item’s target value where
the target value is continuous. Fundamentally, a tree is learned by
splitting the source set into subsets in a recursive way. This process
will complete when splitting will not add value to the prediction.
Athey and Imbens [18] revised the criteria function to find that in
splitting the whole sample, the treatment effect of each observation
within each “leaf” would be the same.
The results of a causal tree for our whole sample are reported in
Fig. 5. We can see that for the subsample with organizations only in
the control and public groups, the main characteristics that may
influence the treatment effect are organizations’ pre-experimental
spam volume and number of IP addresses. For the subsample with
only the private and control groups, the essential variables that may
lead to heterogeneous treatment effects are the pre-experimental
number of botnet and number of IP addresses.
With the causal tree splitting available, for each leaf correspond-
ing to subset Xm, the average treatment effect within the leaf is:
sjXm ¼ E½Yið1Þ  Yið0Þjxi 2 Xm: (4)
As in our experiment randomization design, we did the pair-wise
matching on organizations’ pre-experimental spam volumes.
Companies that have similar pre-experimental spam volumes have
the same probability to be in the control group or in any of the two
treated groups. As a result, when we divide the whole sample based
on pre-experimental spam volume, we can directly use the linear
model to compare the outcomes of control and treated organizations
in each leaf to estimate the CATE. In particular, we add a dummy
representing whether one organization’s log pre-experimental spam
volume is less than 3.6, which is the cutoff resulted from the regres-
sion tree, to show whether we would find heterogeneous treatment
effects among different subgroups. The estimation results are re-
ported in Table 3. Columns 3 and 4 show the estimation results
with the subsample of organizations in the control and private
groups, Columns 5 and 6 show the estimation results with the sub-
sample of organizations in the control and public groups. As we can
see, for the subsample of organizations whose log pre-experimental
spam volumes are larger than 3.6, public treatment significantly
reduces organizations’ outbound spam volume, an indicator of se-
curity condition improvement. However, for the subsample of or-
ganizations in the control and private groups, we do not observe
significant CATE after controlling other variables.
To ensure the causality, it would be more reliable to get the treat-
ment estimator using honest splitting, which means to get the split-
ting and treatment effect from different samples. Specifically, we
could randomly choose a subsample from the data set to find the op-
timal splitting first. Then, this splitting could be applied to estimate
the heterogeneous treatment effects from another subsample, with-
out the concern of sample randomness [18]. The main issue with
this method is that it is hard for us to choose the optimal training
and estimation subsamples.
Causal forest
Unlike one single causal tree, a causal forest is composed of B such
trees, which is only trained by a random subsample of organizations.
If each causal tree, indexed by b, gives us an estimate of the CATE
at x as ŝb ðxÞ, we could calculate the random forest CATE at x by
averaging the treatment effect over B causal trees:
ŝb xð Þ ¼ B1
PB
b¼1 ŝb ðxÞ. According to Breiman [32], this aggre-
gation process over many trees helps reduce the variance of the
estimates.
In our present example, we set the number of trees to be 2000,
and estimate the treatment effect separately for the public and pri-
vate treatment groups. The estimated treatment effects and T-values
are reported in Figs 6 and 7, respectively. We find interesting pat-
terns for the heterogeneous treatment effects. For the public treated
group, we see positive treatment effects for organizations with an
initial low outbound spam volume, especially for those whose log
average pre-experimental outbound spam volume is less than about
3.6 (as in our result in the “Causal tree” section). For organizations
with larger initial outbound spam volume, the majorities have pre-
sented negative treatment effects. The results support Hypotheses 2
and 3. For the private treatment group, we do not observe signi-
ficant heterogeneity in treatment effects among organizations with
various pre-experimental spam volumes.
There can be multiple reasons why large spammers in the pub-
lic group will send out smaller outbound spam volumes after
receiving our treatment. First, these organizations may have larger
but shallower problems (e.g. compromised computers) with their
information systems. As a result, large spammers have a lower
cost to improve their security conditions than their counterparts
with subtle security issues. Second, these organizations may be
more embarrassed when their poor security performance reports
are publicly announced online. In addition, large spammers face
more pressure from their close competitors. Considering their
Figure 5. Result from causal tree for organizations in our experiment. (a) Public versus control and (b) private versus control.
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relatively worse security levels, it is likely their customers will shift
their business to their competitors. We do not observe similar re-
sults from the private treatment effect, indicating that sending
treatment emails by itself lacks effectiveness in spam reduction
and changing organizational behavior on security measures. Our
results show that the combination of information sharing and pub-
lic announcement provides more economic motivation to the
organizations.
Discussions on empirical results
Although our work is a major first step forward to test the idea of a
security evaluation agency, our experiment has some limitations
that may undermine the treatment effects. However, the discovered
treatment effects can be further amplified if we mitigate the existing
shortcomings with the proposed nationwide independent institution.
The first limitation is the security evaluation metric; we only con-
sider outbound spam as a proxy for the latent security level.
However, organizations may pay more attention to other types of
cyber-attacks, such as phishing and DDoS attacks, since these are
more dangerous to organizations’ cybersecurity. Although the exist-
ing results with outbound spam are still valid, we expect organiza-
tions to be more responsive to our intervention if more
comprehensive security reports are provided in the experiment. The
second limitation of the experiment is the visibility of our website.
We had limited time to promote our website to attract attention,
which may have undermined our treatment effect given the
importance of the reputation effect. Also, some organizations may
not have paid enough attention to our emails. Fortunately, this limi-
tation will be largely alleviated if the website is sponsored by the
government. We want to note that the estimated treatment effects
are based on just two waves of treatment emails at the end of
January and March 2014. With constant and longtime notifications,
the influence of our treatment may increase over time.
To sum up, the data from the experiment show that large spam-
mers in the public treatment group sent out significantly smaller out-
bound spam volumes after exposure than those in the control group.
We expect the reason is that organizations in the public treatment
group have taken active measures to clean up existing malwares and
to improve their security protection for new malware prevention.
Our proposed policy with security information evaluation and pub-
licity effectively improve organizations’ security protection with re-
spect to the outbound spam volumes.
Peer effect analysis
From the previous results, we see that security information publicity
induced organizational security improvement, which is measured by
the reduced outbound spam volumes. We do further analysis to re-
cover the underlying mechanisms of organizations’ security strat-
egies. Organizations may improve their security protection due to
the shame of being spammers. On the other hand, they may also
change their strategies due to the peer pressure from their close com-
petitors. If customers and investors of an organization are aware of
Figure 6. Results of treatment effects from causal forest for organizations in our experiment. (a) Public versus control and (b) private versus control
Figure 7. Results of T-values from causal forest for organizations in our experiment. (a) Public versus control and (b) private versus control
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competing companies’ having better security levels, the poorly per-
forming organizations may experience churns.
With our peer ranking information available, we provide organ-
izations a convenient way to compare their security levels with those
of their peers, thus enhancing the peer influence in security manage-
ment. The existence of peer effects is important in understanding or-
ganizations’ security strategies. If peer effects are important, then
providing more comparisons between peers may be more effective in
pushing organizations to invest resources on their security protec-
tion. At the same time, organizations with strong security protection
may lack motivation to correct existing problems since they are al-
ready in the lead.
Peer effects exist if organizations’ behaviors are influenced by
their peers’ mean outcomes, which, in our context, represent the in-
dustry sector’s average security level. The identification of peer ef-
fects is difficult due to the reflection problem, unobservable
variables, and selection problem [33]. To overcome the difficulties,
we implement the excess-variance approach identification strategy.
Excess-variance approach
The identification strategy we use to analyze the existence and magni-
tude of peer effects is the excess-variance approach [24, 34]. The
main idea of this method is to take advantage of various sizes for each
industry group and the mathematical identity that the variances and
sizes do not change in the same proportion. The intuition is as fol-
lows. The unconditional between-group variance is equal to the sum
of (1) the variance of group-level heterogeneity (different industrial
characteristics), (2) between-group variance of individual-level hetero-
geneity (average organizations’ characteristics), and (3) the strength of
peer effects. With different sizes of industries, although the distribu-
tion of group-level heterogeneity is the same, we can use a method
similar to difference-in-differences to compare the between- and
within-group variance from different-sized industries to estimate the
peer effects. Since organizations are not randomly assigned to differ-
ent industry groups, the main issue in applying this identification
method is that the results may be biased if self-selection also makes
the variance change disproportionately to group size. We believe that
it is not a main issue to be considered since cybersecurity is not a
major factor to consider in making a decision to enter the market.
Moreover, it is hard to imagine that organizations will sort them into
peer groups differently, based on the group sizes. For example, finan-
cial services, retail organizations, and ISP will face a high risk of po-
tential cyber-attacks, but the sizes of the three industry groups vary a
lot, as shown in Fig. A1 in the Appendix.
With the typical linear-in-means model [33], organization i’s
spam behavior from industry j, Dij, will be:
Dij ¼ aj þ ðc 1Þj þ ij ; (5)
where aj represents industry-level heterogeneity, eij represents
organization-level heterogeneity, and ej represents the industry
mean of the firm-level heterogeneity. So c is the peer effect param-
eter to be estimated. If c>1, then organizations’ Internet security
levels are influenced by their peers. As in Graham [34] and Popadak
[24], the square of the peer influence, c2, can be identified as
follows:
c2 ¼
E Vbj jSj ¼ 1
h i
 E Vbj jSj ¼ 0
h i
E Vwj jSj ¼ 1
h i
 E Vwj jSj ¼ 0
h i ; (6)





represent the between-group variance and within-group variance for
industry j, respectively. In the empirical analysis, we define Sj¼1 if
the size of industry j is equal to or larger than the median size (26
for two-digit SIC code and 149 for two-digit NAICS code) of all
industries in our data set, and Sj¼0 otherwise. To exclude other
characteristics, the variation attributed to other organizational and
industry-level average characteristics is removed.
The results from the excess-variance approach for spam volumes
are listed in Table 4. Since we report the peer rankings in the treat-
ments (emails and website) using the peer group defined by the two-
digit SIC and NAICS industry codes, we define organizations shar-
ing the same two-digit SIC and NAICS industry codes to be in the
same peer group. The estimated c2 is about 2, which is statistically
different from 1 using bootstrap, rejecting the null hypothesis that
there is no peer effect. Our results support Hypothesis 5—that there
are peer effects among organizations within the same industry
group.
Robustness check
Our estimates are based on a large-scale RFE, which helps us ex-
clude potential problems of omitted variables. But we conduct mul-
tiple robustness checks to provide more reliability of our estimates.
Tobit model
The distribution of the dependent variable—the outbound spam vol-
umes of each organization—is censored at 0, since 40% of the or-
ganizations did not emit any spam in the observed time period. This
may influence our estimation results in an average treatment effect
in linear regressions. We include a robustness check with Tobit
model, and the results are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. We
verify that the results are quite consistent with those we find in the
main results section.
Table 4. Peer effect analysis on spam volume and number of spamming hosts
Spam volume Number of spamming hosts
SIC NAICS SIC NAICS
c2 2.021 2.179 2.095 2.682
P-value for H0: c
2 ¼ 1 0.0002*** 0.0084*** 0.0000*** 0.0004***
c 1.422 1.476 1.447 1.638
Organization-specific covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer organization average covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7919 7919 7919 7919
Notes: This table displays the estimated peer effects using excess variance approach. Columns 1 and 2 represent the results using outbound spam volume.
Columns 3 and 4 represent the results using number of spamming hosts. We use two-digit SIC and NAICS codes to define peer groups. We use bootstrap to test
the null hypothesis of no peer effects for 5000 samples. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Placebo test
Our present experiment started at the end of January 2014. To dem-
onstrate the robustness of our estimated results, we assume that our
experiment started at the end of June in 2013 and re-estimate the
treatment effects. To be specific, we still use the 6-month average
spam volume before and after the assumed experimental start time
as the pre- and post-experimental metrics. For the analysis that
started at the end of June 2013, the post-experimental period will be
from July 2013 to December 2013. We should not find any signi-
ficant effect. The results are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix. We
can see that, when the assumed start time is closer to the actual
experiment start time, the treatment effects get larger (the magni-
tude of the public treatment coefficient is larger). The results support
the proposition that the spam reduction is actually due to our
intervention.
Alternative pre-experimental spam measure
In our experiment design and empirical analysis, we use the 6-month
(from June 2013 to December 2013) average spam volume right be-
fore the start of the experiment (January 2014) as the control of the
organization’s original security condition. To test the robustness of
our results, we re-run the regression with 2-month and 4-month
average spam volumes as the pre-experimental security levels. The
results are presented in Table A5 in the Appendix. We find similar
treatment effects, although the magnitudes of the public treatment
effects are smaller. This may be due to the fluctuation of spam vol-
ume over time.
Differences-in-differences analysis
In our treatment effect analysis in the “Empirical analysis” section,
there can be unobserved characteristics that can be correlated with
other main variables in our regression. To address this potential
problem, we also apply a difference-in-differences approach to find
the treatment effect. To test the robustness of the results, we use
both the Tobit model and linear model. The results are shown in
Table A6 in the Appendix. We can see that the results are consistent
with those in Table 3. As compared with the organizations in the
control group, large spammers tend to send out about 30% less
spam after the experiment.
Alternative security measure
We have multiple spam volume variables in our data set, with which
we can do further analysis to demonstrate the robustness of our main
results with CBL volume data. In addition to the volume data (CBL
volume), which measures the total number of emitted spam, we also
have host data that count the number of IP addresses with positive
spam volume (CBL host). Furthermore, we have the spam volume
measure from another spam data feed: Spamikaze’s PSBL (volume).
The estimation results using CBL host and PSBL volume are presented
in Table A7 in the Appendix. We observe, with both dependent vari-
ables, that large spammers in the public treatment group achieve a
large spam reduction when compared with those in the control group.
Data without ISPs
Since ISPs usually serve residential and business customers, they
generally have different security policies and capabilities than or-
ganizations that independently operate their own Internet infra-
structures. For example, ISPs have less control over their
customers’ behavior on the Internet. Intuitively, we would expect
them to be less responsive to our treatments. In our data set,
there are three industry groups that are related to ISPs: telephone
(group 6), unclassified communication (group 7), and other com-
munication (group 8). We re-estimate the regressions using ob-
servations without those three industry groups and the results are
listed in Table A8 in the Appendix. We can see that, as expected,
the magnitude of the public treatment effects is larger.
Extending experiments
We are currently pursuing possible extensions of our present experi-
ment. For example, we are now collaborating with local researchers at
City University of Hong Kong and KAIST to collect Asian organiza-
tional data. Using several other ASN lookup services on Google, we
have manually identified 2706 valid Asian organizations in China,
Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan. In addition to US in-
dustry codes, we use the Hong Kong Standard Industrial Classification
(HSIC) and the Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC) for
Asian organizations. We use the first two digits of industry codes to
group organizations, and then rank them according to their mal-
activity volume metrics—namely, the security metrics.
We are also implementing the treatment websites in two different
cloud platforms. In Google Cloud, we provide information with three
different languages: Chinese, English, and Korean. In addition, a sep-
arate Chinese website was created in Microsoft Azure, since Google
service is not accessible in China. The websites are supposed to be ac-
cessed by a large number of visitors. In the long run, multiple experi-
ments may be conducted in other countries. Cloud platforms can
efficiently be scaled to serve a large number of website visitors with ef-
ficient content-caching mechanisms.
Concluding remarks
Cyber-insecurity is a serious problem that calls for efforts from both
researchers and governments. The root causes of the issue can be or-
ganizations’ insufficient security investment and the lack of relevant
policies. We argue that the current practice with passive and reactive
security information disclosure does not provide sufficient motiv-
ations for organizations to resolve the problem. Thus, we propose to
set up a government sponsored, third-party institution that pro-
actively monitors organizations’ security levels and periodically pub-
lishes the evaluation reports for transparency. To evaluate the
effectiveness of such an institution, a large-scale RFE on 7919 US or-
ganizations was conducted to provide spam reports to the subjects
in either private or public ways. The results show that the combin-
ations of information sharing and publicity treatment can signi-
ficantly decrease large spammers’ outbound spam volumes, whereas
information awareness treatment by itself is not effective. The signi-
ficance of peer effect indicates that one of the spam reduction motiv-
ations is—peer pressure—from close industry competitors.
We believe that the empirical results of the present paper will
provide direct policy implications for governments as well as other
institutes devoted to cybersecurity issues—namely, policies that re-
duce information asymmetry and promote peer pressure and the es-
tablishment of a security evaluation measure. More broadly, the
results of our paper will benefit the members of cyber community,
including various private and public organizations and individuals,
by bringing their overall attention to cybersecurity issues and pro-
viding them with cybersecurity knowledge.
Cybersecurity research is a burgeoning area and there is still plenty
of work to be done. The approaches and results of the present paper
suggest some such future directions; our empirical work is just a start-
ing point for Internet security policy evaluation. The experiments






/cybersecurity/article/2/1/99/2733163 by guest on 06 M
ay 2021
described in the paper can be further extended to settings with more
comprehensive security evaluation metrics and in other economic en-
vironments. In addition, empirical strategies can be developed to ad-
dress the issue of the endogenous response of bot-herders. Our
ongoing project pursues these directions.
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Appendix 1: Randomization details
To get reliable treatment effect estimation from a RFE, we con-
ducted a stratified, pair-wise matching randomization on 7919 or-
ganizations [20]. Due to heterogeneity of legal regimes and
economic environment across countries, we only included US organ-
izations in the present experiment.
Stratification
One of the standard approaches to avoiding imbalance is stratificat-
ion on a few key characteristics [35]. In stratification, organizations
will be randomly assigned to different treatment groups within each
subgroup, defined by key characteristics. In our experiment, we
defined 195 subgroups by SIC codes (39 industry sectors) and num-
ber of IP addresses (5 segments). The detailed industry and number
of IP addresses groups are listed in Tables A1 and A2. Despite the
correlation between industry activities, we managed to divide firms
into mostly equal sized groups in order to get precise estimation.
The rationale of choosing the two characteristics is as follows.
First, organizations in different industries have different priorities on
security. For example, security should be particularly important for
software companies. Spammers may also have different incentives
based on the “value” of the data that different companies maintain.
In that sense, financial and health sectors may have a higher risk.
Second, organization size may affect the approaches on the system
protection. Organizations with a larger number of IP addresses, gener-
ally with larger size, may face more risks and potential problems. On
the other hand, large organizations usually have an independent IT
department with security experts. With more resources, large organ-
izations can afford better anti-virus software or firewalls to prevent
potential security attacks. Therefore, we divided the whole sample
into five groups according to their IP address counts.
Pair-wise matching
Stratification can only control for the balance of industry sectors
and IP counts and the two variables cannot explain a large share of
the spam volume’s variance. Since the baseline spam volumes can be
Figure A1. Distribution of communication companies’ sizes in our sample
(two-digit SIC code equals to 48).
Table A1. Industrial groups’ description
Group Industry sector Number of
organizations
1 Agriculture, mining, and construction 123
2 Electronic devices 103
3 Publishing 133
4 Chemical and measuring manufacturing 156
5 Other manufacturing 245
6 Telephone 836
7 Unclassified communication 164
8 Other communication 163
9 Transportation 253
10 Durable wholesale 215
11 Non-durable wholesale 126
12 Furniture retail 111
13 Non-classified retail 145
14 Other retail 158
15 Depository institutions 186
16 Credit and real estate 133
17 Security 255
18 Insurance 199
19 Holdings and other financial companies 179
20 Health services 337
21 Colleges 423
22 Education service other than colleges 214
23 Management consulting 181
24 Business consulting 150
25 Other management service 116
26 Engineer, accounting, and research 194
27 Non-classified business service 484
28 Computer programming 249
29 Prepackaged software 140
30 Computer integrated systems 157
31 Computer processing 162
32 Information retrieval 102
33 Non-classified computer service 167
34 Other business service 222
35 Legal service 108
36 Membership organization 93
37 Miscellaneous service 115
38 Other service 223
39 Public administration 199
Table A2. Groups based on the number of IP addresses
Number of IP addresses 0–427 428–1024 1024–104 104–105 >105
Group 1 2 3 4 5
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the best proxy of the organizations’ security condition, we did the
pair-wise matching on organizations’ pre-experimental spam vol-
umes. In practice, we found three organizations that minimize the
sum of three pairwise differences among them. One problem we
faced during this process was the distribution of spam volumes. We
found that the distribution for a given organization varies greatly
over time and both the distributions of spam volumes and the num-
ber of IP addresses for the whole sample was highly skewed. Thus,
we used the natural logarithm transformed 6-month average spam
volumes as our pre-experimental spam volumes to get higher prob-
ability of detecting the treatment effects.
Re-randomization
After the random assignment with stratification and pair-wise match-
ing, we checked the distances between the control group and two
treated groups with respect to companies’ various characteristics. We
followed the procedures in Morgan et al. (2012) to set the pre-
specified criteria. With 10,000 simple random draws from our sample
followed the previous two steps, we created a simulated distribution
of distance between any two groups and set the 5% quantile as the
criteria for randomization. Finally, with the 10,000 randomization as-
signments satisfying the re-randomization criteria for power calcula-
tion, we randomly chose one of them as our executed one.
Appendix 2: Additional figures and tables
Table A3. Treatment effects estimation
Avg. treatment effects Heterogeneous treatment effects
Overall Public versus control Private versus control
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private treatment 0.0243 0.0114 0.258*** 0.139
(0.1480) (0.0655) (0.0998) (0.1070)
Public treatment 0.074 0.0675 0.332*** 0.244***
(0.1480) (0.0706) (0.0923) (0.0698)
Indicator 6.811*** 0.342 8.276*** 0.028
(0.6290) (0.3480) (0.5310) (0.1420)
Private treatment  indicator 0.263*
(0.1340)
Public treatment  indicator 0.333** 0.256** 0.174
(0.1340) (0.1050) (0.1110)
Pre-experimental spam volume 0.702*** 0.671*** 0.711***
(0.0269) (0.0605) (0.0372)
Number of IP addresses 1.693*** 1.618*** 1.726***
(0.1610) (0.1840) (0.1410)
(Number of IP addresses)2 0.0800*** 0.0756*** 0.0823***
(0.0076) (0.00931) (0.0065)
Number of botnets 0.280*** 0.278*** 0.276***
(0.0254) (0.0229) (0.0295)
Stock 0.328*** 0.23 0.474***
(0.1060) (0.1490) (0.1020)
Intercept 0.886*** 9.099*** 6.226*** 9.037*** 8.696*** 8.695***
(0.1080) (0.7590) (0.5230) (0.7500) (0.2770) (0.6460)
Industry No Two-digit SIC No Two-digit SIC No Two-digit SIC
P-value for H0: a1 ¼ a2 0.7363 0.3220
Observations 7919 7919 5280 5280 5280 5280
R-squared 0 0.744 0.434 0.751 0.501 0.745
Notes: This table displays the estimated private and public treatment effects with Tobit model. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates of the differences between
the spam volume of treatment groups and control controlling for pre-experimental spam volume, number of pre-experimental IP addresses, number of pre-experi-
mental IP addresses squared, number of pre-experimental infesting botnets, whether or not publicly traded, and industry fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 report the
estimates of the heterogeneous treatment effects with organizations in control and public treatment group. The indicator equals to 1 if organization’s log pre-ex-
perimental spam volume is less than 3.6. Columns 5 and 6 report the estimates of the heterogeneous treatment effects with organizations in control and private
treatment group. The indicator equals to 1 if organization’s log pre-experimental botnet is less than 3.4. Standard errors are clustered by industry codes and
shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A4. Placebo test
Post-experimental spam volume
June 2013 July 2013 August 2013
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private treatment 0.0372 0.00670 0.00487
(0.0455) (0.0428) (0.0433)
Public treatment 0.00349 0.06500 0.04360 0.06450 0.05090 0.12600
(0.0465) (0.0600) (0.0431) (0.0702) (0.0433) (0.0988)
Indicator 3.545*** 3.093*** 2.830***
(0.1420) (0.1170) (0.1640)
Public treatment  indicator 0.114*** 0.0251 0.1000
(0.0574) (0.0635) (0.1060)
Pre-experimental spam volume 0.588*** 0.275*** 0.561*** 0.299*** 0.559*** 0.296***
(0.0151) (0.0364) (0.0149) (0.0361) (0.0151) (0.0257)
Number of IP addresses 0.259*** 0.134** 0.437*** 0.251*** 0.418*** 0.289***
(0.0413) (0.0546) (0.0396) (0.0536) (0.0372) (0.0557)
(Number of IP addresses)2 0.00595** 0.00353 0.0182*** 0.0107*** 0.0165*** 0.0116***
(0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0023) (0.0034)
Number of botnets 0.187*** 0.218*** 0.279*** 0.274*** 0.258*** 0.277***
(0.0176) (0.0274) (0.0194) (0.0343) (0.0188) (0.0289)
Stock 0.111 0.0767 0.0548 0.0955 0.0105 0.0984
(0.0677) (0.0925) (0.0659) (0.0714) (0.0681) (0.0785)
Intercept 1.002*** 3.116*** 1.746*** 2.199*** 1.688*** 1.734***
(0.2550) (0.3080) (0.1990) (0.2920) (0.1930) (0.3410)
Industry Two-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Two-digit SIC Two-digit SIC
Observations 7919 5280 7919 5280 7919 5280
R-squared 0.740 0.847 0.768 0.846 0.760 0.821
Notes: This table displays the robustness check with placebo test. Columns 1–2, 3–4, and 5–6 use October, November, and December 2013 as our experiment
start time, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by industry codes and shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A5. Treatment effects with alternative measures of pre-experimental spam volume
Post-experimental spam volume
Two-month average pre-experimental Four-month average pre-experimental
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Private treatment 0.0196 0.0176
(0.0357) (0.0317)
Public treatment 0.07310 0.237** 0.226** 0.233** 0.06110 0.208* 0.196*** 0.205**
(0.0442) (0.1120) (0.0895) (0.0925) (0.0407) (0.1120) (0.0732) (0.0836)
Indicator 0.983*** 0.965*** 0.967*** 0.735*** 0.728*** 0.737***
(0.1230) (0.1060) (0.1330) (0.1260) (0.0936) (0.1210)
Public treatment 
indicator
0.220* 0.203** 0.211* 0.194 0.177** 0.187*
(0.1200) (0.0976) (0.1090) (0.1200) (0.0852) (0.1050)
Pre-experimental
spam volume
0.585*** 0.497*** 0.479*** 0.477*** 0.597*** 0.536*** 0.517*** 0.515***
(0.0435) (0.0234) (0.0386) (0.0332) (0.0401) (0.0236) (0.0323) (0.0238)
Number of IP addresses 0.436*** 0.414*** 0.393*** 0.394*** 0.389*** 0.387*** 0.364*** 0.366***
(0.0567) (0.0508) (0.0496) (0.0436) (0.0522) (0.0498) (0.0511) (0.0434)
(Number of IP
addresses)2
0.0168*** 0.0149*** 0.0144*** 0.0147*** 0.0145*** 0.0139*** 0.0131*** 0.0134***
(0.0039) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0025)
Number of botnets 0.306*** 0.304*** 0.308*** 0.311*** 0.288*** 0.289*** 0.291*** 0.293***
(0.0592) (0.0268) (0.0572) (0.0430) (0.0544) (0.0261) (0.0504) (0.0374)
Stock 0.0232 0.0224 0.0235 0.0446 0.0314 0.0218 0.015 0.0332
(0.0732) (0.0861) (0.1010) (0.0841) (0.0650) (0.0840) (0.0961) (0.0777)
Intercept 1.758*** 0.445* 0.726*** 0.716*** 1.679*** 0.650*** 0.862*** 0.852***
(0.1990) (0.2360) (0.2350) (0.2510) (0.1830) (0.2360) (0.2040) (0.2310)








Observations 7919 5280 5280 5280 7919 5280 5280 5280
R-squared 0.741 0.740 0.746 0.748 0.747 0.744 0.750 0.751
Notes: This table displays the robustness check with alternative measures of pre-experimental spam volume. Columns 1–4 use monthly average spam volume
from November 2013 to December 2013 while Columns 5–8 use monthly average spam volume from September 2013 to December 2013. The results in Columns
2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 are from the subsample of organizations that are in control and public treatment groups. The indicator is a dummy variable that indicates whether
the company’s log pre-experimental spam volume is less than 3.6. Standard errors are clustered by industry codes and shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A6. Treatment effects with difference-in-differences model
Tobit model OLS model
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public treatment 0.0118 0.00786 0.00895 0.01000 0.0118 0.00898 0.0107 0.00961
(0.0756) (0.0553) (0.0397) (0.0562) (0.0756) (0.0577) (0.0385) (0.0582)
After 0.735*** 0.652*** 0.653*** 0.653*** 0.776*** 0.686*** 0.687*** 0.687***
(0.1620) (0.1100) (0.1600) (0.1500) (0.1650) (0.1150) (0.1690) (0.1590)
Indicator 6.181*** 3.785*** 3.714*** 3.696*** 7.668*** 4.535*** 4.421*** 4.399***
(0.1100) (0.1020) (0.2260) (0.1970) (0.1340) (0.1240) (0.3430) (0.3020)
Public treatment  after 0.287 0.263* 0.264*** 0.264* 0.305 0.277* 0.279*** 0.279**
(0.2310) (0.1570) (0.0660) (0.1350) (0.2350) (0.1640) (0.0697) (0.1410)
Public treatment  indicator 1.027*** 0.901*** 0.902*** 0.901*** 1.087*** 0.958*** 0.953*** 0.954***
(0.1680) (0.1160) (0.1520) (0.1440) (0.1960) (0.1400) (0.1590) (0.1520)
Indicator  after 0.0153 0.0543 0.0581 0.0613 0.08 0.104 0.12 0.121
(0.1550) (0.1140) (0.0811) (0.1130) (0.1810) (0.1370) (0.0875) (0.1210)
Public treatment 
indicator  after
0.324 0.310* 0.310*** 0.310** 0.409 0.379* 0.382*** 0.380**
(0.2390) (0.1660) (0.0672) (0.1440) (0.2800) (0.2000) (0.0910) (0.1620)
Number of IP addresses 0.146*** 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.288*** 0.255*** 0.246***
(0.0081) (0.0213) (0.0172) (0.0133) (0.0380) (0.0333)
Number of botnets 0.569*** 0.563*** 0.565*** 0.571*** 0.568*** 0.572***
(0.0240) (0.0727) (0.0530) (0.0275) (0.0976) (0.0716)
Stock 0.0386 0.0373 0.0219 0.0899 0.0847 0.109
(0.0546) (0.1190) (0.0975) (0.0889) (0.1850) (0.1480)
Intercept 1.758*** 0.445* 0.726*** 0.716*** 1.679*** 0.650*** 0.862*** 0.852***
(0.1990) (0.2360) (0.2350) (0.2510) (0.1830) (0.2360) (0.2040) (0.2310)






Observations 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560
Notes: This table displays the robustness check with DID model on subsample of organizations in public and control groups. Columns 1–4 report the estimates
from Tobit models and Columns 5–8 report the estimates from OLS models. The “After” is a dummy variable indicates whether the outbound spam volume is
collected after our experiment has started. The “Indicator” is a dummy variable represents whether the organization’s log pre-experimental spam volume is less
than 3.6. Standard errors are clustered by industry codes and shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and
*** at the 1% level.
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Table A7. Treatment effects with different security measures
CBL host PSBL volume
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Private treatment 0.0198 0.0136 0.0126 0.01680
(0.0571) (0.0262) (0.0431) (0.0222)
Public treatment 0.02650 0.03080 0.12300 0.0979* 0.05090 0.0519** 0.218* 0.180**
(0.0570) (0.0264) (0.0984) (0.0517) (0.0422) (0.0223) (0.1270) (0.0889)
Indicator 3.375*** 0.330*** 1.945*** 0.318***
(0.0743) (0.0630) (0.0917) (0.0748)
Public treatment  indicator 0.1100 0.0888 0.217* 0.175*
(0.1070) (0.0604) (0.1280) (0.0886)
Pre-experimental spam metric 0.724*** 0.662*** 0.493*** 0.467***
(0.0162) (0.0242) (0.0255) (0.0320)
Number of IP addresses 0.160*** 0.150*** 0.145*** 0.121***
(0.0187) (0.0229) (0.0294) (0.0312)
(Number of IP addresses)2 0.00453*** 0.00356** 0.00809*** 0.00723***
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0020)
Number of botnets 0.0842*** 0.0862*** 0.254*** 0.244***
(0.0101) (0.0120) (0.0151) (0.0176)
Stock 0.0592 0.0387 0.0426 0.0484
(0.0432) (0.0528) (0.0333) (0.0383)
Intercept 1.845*** 0.650*** 4.322*** 0.273 0.597*** 0.493*** 2.024*** 0.168
(0.0404) (0.1190) (0.0683) (0.1830) (0.0304) (0.1230) (0.0912) (0.1430)








Observations 7919 7919 5280 5280 7919 7919 5280 5280
R-squared 0.000 0.792 0.505 0.792 0.000 0.685 0.284 0.689
Notes: This table displays the robustness check with different security measures. Columns 1–4 report the treatment effects for number of infesting hosts by
CBL in each quantile. Columns 5–8 report the treatment effects for spam volume by PSBL in each quantile. The results in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 are from the sub-
sample of organizations that are in control and public treatment groups. The indicator is a dummy variable that indicates whether the company’s log pre-experi-
mental spam volume is less than 3.6. Standard errors are clustered by industry codes and shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A8. Treatment effects without ISPs
Average treatment effects Heterogeneous treatment effects
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Private treatment 0.0172 0.00679 0.00222 0.0111
(0.0802) (0.0462) (0.0385) (0.0428)
Public treatment 0.03430 0.05830 0.05720 0.06210 0.31300 0.306** 0.293*** 0.313**
(0.0795) (0.0465) (0.0472) (0.0498) (0.2030) (0.1440) (0.0984) (0.1210)
Indicator 4.429*** 0.274* 0.283 0.287*
(0.1480) (0.1650) (0.1730) (0.1600)
Public treatment 
indicator
0.311 0.312** 0.293*** 0.310**
(0.2100) (0.1510) (0.1080) (0.1400)
Pre-experimental
spam volume
0.521*** 0.506*** 0.506*** 0.504*** 0.486*** 0.487***
(0.0240) (0.0251) (0.0206) (0.0372) (0.0239) (0.0297)
Number of IP
addresses
0.331*** 0.323*** 0.315*** 0.323*** 0.311*** 0.307***
(0.0437) (0.0404) (0.0385) (0.0537) (0.0440) (0.0512)
(Number of IP
addresses)2
0.00985*** 0.0105*** 0.0102*** 0.00925*** 0.00958*** 0.00963***
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0030)
Number of botnets 0.361*** 0.377*** 0.375*** 0.353*** 0.369*** 0.367***
(0.0440) (0.0538) (0.0307) (0.0565) (0.0425) (0.0322)
Stock 0.0872 0.125** 0.134** 0.0828 0.0867 0.108
(0.0679) (0.0491) (0.0571) (0.0853) (0.0749) (0.0691)
Intercept 1.999*** 1.185*** 1.364*** 1.310*** 5.531*** 0.904*** 1.065*** 1.012***
(0.0566) (0.1740) (0.1430) (0.1510) (0.1430) (0.2560) (0.2680) (0.2690)








Observations 6755 6755 6755 6755 4506 4506 4506 4506
R-squared 0.000 0.663 0.673 0.675 0.420 0.660 0.671 0.674
Notes: This table displays the robustness check without ISPs’ observations. Columns 1–4 report the average treatment effects and Columns 5–8 report the het-
erogeneous treatment effects. The results in Columns 5–8 are from the subsample of organizations that are in control and public treatment groups. The indicator
is a dummy variable indicates whether the company’s log pre-experimental spam volume is less than 3.6. Standard errors are clustered by industry codes and
shown in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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